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Abstract
This study focuses on the relationship between political
corruption and economic development through a cross-national
survey of twenty-tlu·ee of the twenty-five European Union Member
States. This study was conducted in order to expand on the
research conducted by Margaret Goodman and Nathaniel Len:
Thc survey examined the cffect of political corruption on six
dependent variables that represent cconomic development: gross
domestic product per capita, unemployment rate, education,
fcrtility rate, infant mortality rate, and government debt. Of the six,
GOP, unemployment and fertility were shown to be significant.
The findings suggest that corruption index increase coupled with a
job creation program caused decreases in unemployment and
increascs in GOP.
Introduction
Corruption is a multi-faceted phenomenon. It affects our
workplaces as well as our governments, and due to its scope,
corruption has bccn cvaluated through a number oflenses. Some
scholars have evaluated corruption through economics and others
through politics. Still others have looked at the correlation
between the two fields, and it is this third area of corruption
analysis that interests this discussion. Within the cross-discipline
research, there are two theoretical camps through which to pose an
examination: either one believes corruption is a detriment to
economic development, or one believes it to be a promoting force.
This research devoted its attention to the comparative analysis of
these two claims.
In order to accomplish this task, the research originally
posed three questions: I) Does corruption have a positive cffect on
economic development in the EU states, 2) Was the research
conducted by Margaret Goodman sufficient to discount the Leff
Theory, and 3) Which specific areas of economic development
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does conllption affect? With these questions in mind, the research
originally contended that the level of corruption would be
positively correlated with the indicators of a country's economic
developmei1t. This correlation would be due to conllption's
tendency to quicken the pace of the bureaucratic process in
accordance with Leffs theory.
However, once analysis was conducted the data displayed
different results. Due to these findings, the research, rather than
explaining the results within its original scope, determined that a
better course of action would be to abandon its hypothesis in favor
of the opposite hypothesis. Therefore, the focus of this paper shall
be four-fold. It shall address the development of the two schools
within the literature, model and variable development, data
analysis, and finally, present a conclusion.
Literature Review
Definition
In order to gain a better understanding for the
methodological approach, one must examine the literature of the
field; the findings of such an analysis follow. Throughout the
literature, one of the largest problems facing political scientists has
been an inconsistent definition of cOlTuption. Lancaster tells us
that definitions can be divided into two sets: one set discusses
cOllllption as a behavior performed by public officials which
"deviates from some ideal state or natural condition about which
scholars have different notions" and the second set which defines it
in terms of systems containing particular attributes with a goal of
explaining the "origins or persistence of the systems that elicit the
apparently corrupt behavior" (Lancaster 200 I, 6). An example
from the first set is Rose-Ackerman's definition, which states that
corruption is "behavior that deviates from principal-agent
agreements between voters, politicians, and bureaucrats implicit in
democracy" (Rose-Ackerman 1999). The key is that her interest
lies in the behavior which causes the deviation, not the persistence
of the deviation. An example from the second group is Tilman's
definition of corruption "as the result of the adoption of a market-
pricing mechanism for government goods rather than a mandatory
pricing model of allocation" (Tilman 1970). Tilman's definition is
Res Publica 9
within the second sct becausc his focus is on the systems rather
than the bchavior ofthe actors.
In addition, Hellman et al. defined corruption in terms of
three bundles: influence, state capture, and administrative
corruption (Hellman et al. 2000). The research divided these
bundles according to the source and distribution of rents.
Influence occurs when finns effect policy formation and thus
legally get their bencfits. State capture is when bribers receive
special private benefits that are legal but are only provided through
bribery. Finally, administrative corruption occurs when officials
use their provided power over a firm to derive rents for themselves
(Hellman et al. 2000). These vast definitions cause great confusion
for the scholar when approaching the issue. For this examination,
the study is more concerned with the systematic effects that
corruption has rather than the bchavioral. Transparency
Intcrnational, the organization which created the Corruptions
Perceptions Index, provides the working definition for this
examination. Their definition of corruption is "operationally
defined as the misuse of entrusted power for private gain" (TI).
Transparency International differentiates between "according to
rule" and "against the rule" corruption: "facilitation payments,
where a bribe is paid to receive preferential treatment for
something that the bribe receiver is required to do by law,
constitute the fonner. The latter, on the othcr hand, is a bribe paid
to obtain services the bribe receivcr is prohibited from providing"
(TI).
Theoretical Background
Another major division within the ficld exists between a
focus on corruption's effect on politics and the economy versus the
effect of the economy or politics on corruption. For the purposes
of this cxamination, the reader will be directed towards the fonner
division rather than the latter. Within this division, specifically
towards economic development, there are two theoretical camps.
The first primarily defines itself through two theories proposed by
Nathaniel Leff and Samuel Huntington respectively. These theories
state that corruption aids the advancement of the economy due to
its ability to remove many of the roadblocks that presently exist
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within bureaucratic govermnents. Leff examines corruption's
ability to allow government to focus on a number of topics
including: other matters of state, reduction of uncertainty, increases
within investment due to that lack of uncertainty, andits ability to
act as a "hedge against bad policy" (Leff 1964,514-515). In
addition, Leff s theory claims that the most efficient will benefit
from corruption in the bureaucracy. This benefit will allow for
more openness within the economy while weeding out the
inefficient entities. Leffs theory is general and applies to all
bureaucratic countries. Huntington claims that "in terms of
economic growth, the only thing worse than a society with a rigid,
over-centralized, dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid, over-
centralized honest bureaucracy" (Huntington 1968, 497). The
theories agree that conuption aids economic development, and
since Goodman's focus is on Leffrather than Huntington, this
study shall direct its attention to Leffs theory.
The second theoretical camp, advocated by Margaret
Goodman, is a basic sense construct, which states that corruption
hinders economic development through such means as limiting
business expansion and costing more than taxation. In her
argument, Goodman asserts that efficiency will not be the end goal
of bureaucratic cOlTuption. Rather, the conclusion will be a
decrease in efficiency. In addition, Goodman postulates what the
removal of COlTUption would offer. While this theory lacks support,
Goodman concludes that the cessation of cOlTuption would actually
economic development within her case-study of the Yucatan state
of Mexico (Goodman 1974). However, her explanation focuses
too much on non-governmental organizations and too little on the
role of the government and bureaucratic entities. In addition,
Goodman's research is far too narrow in scope to disprove Leffs
theory. The article merely addresses one of the reasons why Leff
believes that bureaucratic corruption will benefit economic
development. This prohibitive assessment is based on her lack of
geographical diversity, her use of qualitative research instead of
quantitative, and her failure to apply any of her findings to other
developing and developed nations.
Res Publica II
Previolls Research
These two constructs formed thc basis for this corI1lption
research. In order to grasp further background upon which this
research is based, one should investigate the research of previous
scholars of corruption as it pertains to this examination. This
examination involves corruption's effect on economic
development; therefore, the most pertinent case was Margaret
Goodman's research on the Yucatan Peninsula in which she
examined Leff's Theory (Goodman 1974). However, other
research areas are also pertinent. In examining eOlTllption as an
independent variable, the study found numerous areas of previous
research. According to Kaufmann et al.- who measured
development in terms of per capita income, child mortality, and
Iiteracy- corruption has been shown to limit development
(Kaufmann et al. 1999). This research contributed two variables to
the study and was influential in the beginnings ofthis research.
Previous research has also shown that corruption has the following
effects on issues related to economic development: it retards
economic policy making (Bai and Wei 2000) and lowers Foreign
Direct Investment (Wei and Shleifer 2000). In addition, the
research found the work of Bardhan which argued that corruption
creates economic efficiency (Bardhan 1997) similar to Leff's
theory. Political areas affected by corruption include lowered
attitudes towards governments (Anderson and Tverdova 2003) and
increased state capture rates (Hellman and Kaufmann 2001). Both
of these studies used and validated the independent variable for
this research (the Corruption Perceptions Index). Further
examination of the variable comes in the next section.
Research Design and Measurement
The Cases
As the literature shows, corruption analysis exists both in
qualitative and quantitative studies. However, in regards to Leff's
theOly, only Margaret Goodman's qualitative research has been
conducted. The problem with Goodman's research is three-fold.
First, Goodman's research was focused only on a single case study,
the Yucatan Peninsula, as this qualitative analysis was far too
narrow to ever dismiss such a generalized theOly. Second,
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Goodman's research was geographically narrow- the theory
made no reference specifically to the Latin American area. Finally,
Goodman's research cannot transport to other examinations. This
is demonstrated in that no scholar after Goodman has used her
findings to perpetuate their cases. Therefore, this examination
looks at the cases of the European Union Member States (EUMS).
These countries include: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech
Figure 1: Corruption Index Levels from 2000-2004
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Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Gennany, Greece,
Hungary, Spain, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg,
Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom. Since data for Malta and Cyprus did not
exist within the index previous to 2003, these coun'tries were
removed from the study. The EUMS countries are optimal to
address the three-fold criticism of Goodman. First, they display a
quantitative research. Second, while they are in close proximity,
they display differences amongst economic development and
corruption as Figure 1 displays. Third, the results will be
transportable to other research due to their varied levels of
economic development. Finally, the over-arching bureaucracy
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present in the European Union, in addition to the bureaucracies
already present on the national level, offers a unique insight into
Leffs Theory of Beneficial Bureaucratic Corrnption.
Independent Variable: Corrztption
The independent variable for this research is political
corruption. It is measured through the Corruption Perceptions
Index (CPI) produced by Transparency International. This index is
a scale derived from a collection of scales issued by other
organizations. Each year the exact number of scales included in the
index changes; the most recent index for 2004 includes twelve
scales:
BEEPS, the Business Environment and Enterprise Performance
Survey, 2002;
CU, the State Capacity Survey by the Center for International
Earth Science Information Network at Columbia University,
2003;
EIU, The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2004;
FH, Freedom House Nations in Transit, 2004;
II, Information International, Beirut, Lebanon, 2003;
IMD, the International Institute for Management Development,
2002-04;
MOB, a multilateral development bank, 2002;
MIG, Grey Area Dynamics Ratings by the Merchant International
Group, 2004;
PERC, the Political and Economic Risk Consultancy, Hong Kong,
2002-04;
TIIGI, Gallup International on bchalf of Transparency International,
Bribc Payers Index Survey, 2002;
WEF, the World Economic Forum, 2002-04;
WMRC, the World Markets Rcsearch Centrc, 2004 (CPI 2004).
Thc CPI rangcs from 10 to 0, where 10 represcnts a
corruption free government, and 0 represents a completely corrupt
government. The range for the EUMS extends fi'om 10-3.4.
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To display the effects of Leff s theory over a period of time,
the measures are conducted from 2000-2004. These values are
then applied to dependent variables.
Dependent Variables
In Leffs research- as well as Goodman's- economic
development had to be operationalized, and this research is no
different. Therefore, this study chose to operationalize economic
development based upon six dependent variables which examine
five sub-sections of economic development. These six variables
are: Gross Domestic Product per capita, Governmental Debt,
Long-Term Unemployment Rate, Education level, Life Expectancy
at birth, and Fertility Rate, and the five sub-sections are wealth
(GOP), debt (Debt), labor (Unemployment Rate), labor
development (Education), and labor replacement (Fertility and
IMR).
This study chose GOP/capita based on its ability to display
the growth of a state's fiscal economy and its accruing wealth. Its
selection is also due to previous research conducted by Kaufmann
et al (Kaufmann et a1. 1999). The measure is detennined by
subtracting the value of any goods or services used in production
from the value of goods and services produced. The measure is
expressed in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) versus the average
of the EUMS, which is set at 100. Therefore, if the value is greater
than 100, the country is better than average (EuroStat, GOP). The
expectation for this variable is that it will show corruption's impact
on the wealth accumulation of a country.
The next variable chosen was Governmental Debt.
Government debt was added due to a discussion of possible
negative effects addressed by Leff (Leff 1964). The effect is based
on the usefulness of government spending; if corruption were
present, officials would be inclined to spend money based on
demand from bribers rather than on other legislation. Since the
cost to improve would be higher than maintaining the status quo,
Leff postulated that government debt would decrease. This theory
agrees with the concept of economic development because the
European Union's Maastricht treaty, in an effort to develop the
economy has maintains a debt limit of sixty percent. The
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expectation is that this variable will show findings that are opposite
of those postulated by Lcff If this is the expectation, then the
study should hope to find a ncgative correlation between the two
measures. Governmental debt is determincd as a percentage of the
GDP for that year. Foreign Currency Debt is transfcrred first into
the national currency. Each figure is then converted to a EUR
value based upon the value ofthc Euro at the end ofthe relevant
year (as determined by the European Central Bank) (Eurostat,
Debt).
The third variable is Long-Term Unemployment Rate.
This variable was selected based upon theories determined within
Nice's research on welfare benefits (Nice 1986,292). The variable
is determined through survey data conducted by Eurostat. The
survey asked for the number of individuals who were long-term
(12 months or more) unemployed citizens; the unemployed person
must be at least 15 years of age and be actively seeking
employment. That number was then taken as a ratio to the number
of active members of the population. The active population is the
total number of employed and unemployed population (Eurostat,
Unemployment). This study expects the given variable to explain
corruption's effect on labor. The desired outcome would be a
negative correlation between unemployment and the CPI. This
would show that decreases in corruption tend to aid the labor
section of economic development.
The f01ll1h variable is education attainment level. This
variable was selected based upon Husted's definition of economic
development which seeks secular increases in education among
other indicators (Husted 1999, 342). The expected outcome is that
education will be positively correlated to the CPI measure and
thereby would explain thc labor development section of economic
development. Eurostat dcfines the CPI measure as the "percentagc
of the population aged 20 to 24 having completed at least upper
secondary education" (Upper level secondary education was
further defined as the education level ofISCED 3-4). This value
was the numerator and the total population within the age cohort
was the denominator. The figures were gathered from Eurostat's
annual Labour Force Survey (Eurostat, Education).
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The fifth variable is total fertility rate. This variable was
chosen in order to observe replacement rates for labor forces. The
expectation is that the variable will show a positive correlation.
This would mean that as corruption decreases, fertility will
increase, allowing for the replacement of the workforce as well as
the addition of new labor for new positions created during
economic development. The measure for this variable is the mean
number of children that would be born alive to a woman during her
lifetime. This is a hypothetical measure that offers an indication of
the rate at which the workforce is increased; this replacement level
is set at 2.1 (Eurostat, Fertility).
The final variable is infant mortality rate per 1,000 live
births. The variable was chosen for its relation to Kaufmann et
al. 's research (Kaufmann et al. 1999). The study expects that this
variable, in addition to feliility rate, will show that corruption aids
in the advancement of the labor replacement section of economic
development. The measure is defined as "the ratio of deaths of
children less than one year of age during the year to the number of
live births in that year (Eurostat, Life)." The measure offers an
insight into the advancement level of a society. If the country is
indeed developing, it should observe decreases in its infant
mortality rate.
Hypotheses
When this study began, the research was directed toward the
examination ofLeffs theory from a supportive standpoint.
Namely, the hypothesis proposed that Leff's theory was true and
that Margaret Goodman's research focused too nan-owly on a
single outlier to properly discount this theory. The study embarked
upon this attempt to validate Leffs theory only to conclude that
the data supported the opposite hypothesis- the data supported a
furtherance of Goodman's claim. Due to this finding, the research
was left with two options: 1) revise the hypotheses based on the
observations made in order to find a causal relationship and
proceed in a differef\t direction than was first prescribed, or 2)
maintain the cun-ent position and try to account for the lack of data
support. This study chose to revise the hypotheses in light of its
initial findings, citing that sufficient data was not present in order
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to establish a counter-claim to the original hypothesis. Therefore,
the study was left formulating new hypotheses.
Due to the inability of SPSS software to formulate a
hypothesis measure with multiple dependent variables, the study
was forced to examine each dependent variable separately.
Consequently, this produced six separate hypotheses rather than
one large, over-arching hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: The first dependent variable was GOP/capita. This
study proposes that as the corruption index increases (corruption is
eliminated), GOP/capita will also increase.
Corruption index increase -------------------------> GOP increase
Hypothesis 2: The second dependent variable was Governmental
Debt. This study proposes that as the corruption index increases,
debt will decrease.
Corruption index increase -------------------------> Debt decrease
Hypothesis 3: The third dependent variable was long-term
unemployment rate. This study proposes that as the corruption
index increases, unemployment will decrease.
Corruption index increase ------------> Unemployment decrease
Hypothesis 4: The fourth dependent variable was education level.
This study proposes that as the corruption index increases,
education will also increase.
Corruption index increase -------------------> Education increase
Hypothesis 5: The fifth dependent variable was feliility rate. This
study proposes that as the corruption index increases, fertility will
also increase.. This is a corollary measure.
Corruption index increase ---------------------> Fertility increase
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Hypothesis 6: The sixth dependent variable was infant mortality
rate. This study proposes that as corruption index increases, infant
mortality will decrease. This is a corollary measure.
Corruption index increase -----> Infant MOliality Rate decrease
Data and Findings
This section of the research is dedicated to the results of the
data analysis and a discussion of their meaning. Throughout this
section, the study will explain the process by which it developed its
data research. The main findings of this section, with the
exception of the education level variable, are in accordance with
the proposed hypotheses.
The study began data analysis by entering all data into a
SPSS document. The format divided variables first by year and
then by country. It should again be noted that the countries of
Malta and Cyprus were not included within this research due to a
lack of data for the corruption variable. However, since both
countries ranked within the first standard deviation for the
conuption variable, this study has concluded that their impact
should be less than if they had been outlying cases. The bi-variate
analysis was conducted using each variable, dependent and
independent, based upon year. Therefore, the CPI for 2004 only
relates to the GDP, debt, unemployment, education, feliility, and
IMR for 2004. The years contained within the study are 2000-
2004. The measures used for the bi-variate research were
Pearson's Correlation Coefficient and Significance Test. The
regression analysis used measures for both the model and variable.
For the model, the repOlied regression measures are R2, F, and F
significance. For the variable, the reported regression measures
are Beta, Standardized Beta, t, and t significance.
At this point, the focus shall shift to the individual
hypotheses and their findings. Note that since SPSS'programming
made it impossible to measure multiple dependent variables, each
variable is incapable of showing multi-collinearity within the
model. This eliminates the necessity for the t statistic. Regardless,
it will be reported so for data reproduction purposes.
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Hlpothesis 1: GDPlcapita
Oata Analysis for all of the variables began with a bi-
variate analysis amongst all of the variables, independent and
dependent, to determine the significance of each in relation not
only to corTuption, but also to one another. As we see in Table I,
GOP showed significance to the .0 I level in all years of this study.
Therefore, we can conclude that there is a strong rclationship
between the two. In addition, although not shown in the table,
GOP showed a strong relationship to the .01 level with Fertility
and Unemployment. This seems logical due to the fact that these
were the three variables that showed significance in corruption.
In further study, the variable was placed into a year-by-year
regression model that is displayed in Table 2. As it shows, the
regression displayed a high R' value as well as a significant F
value for the model each year. While there is some fluctuation,
this can be accounted for by the progression of time. Simply stated,
some years will be slightly better or worse than others. The
coefficient measures were also significant. This allows us, as
researchers, to conclude that decreases in the level of political
corruption had a causal relationship with increases in GOP during
this five-year span. However, we should note that these figures
only tell us that it happened each year. Consequently, the model
could have shown no significance one year and still would not
have retuted the fact that, in all other years, this trend was true.
Possible explanations for this phenomenon are too numerous to
comprehensively discuss here, but some include: more open
economic systems due to the ability for greater competition, and
less controlling laws delineated to aid one finn while hurting
others. This meant that more research was necessary across the
other variables to determine where other possible significances
could be found. Therefore, the study progressed to its second
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: Debt
As stated above, the aualysis for all variables began with a
bi-variate test to locate correlations. As Table I indicates,
governmental debt was found to be insignificant with respect to
corruption. In fact, governmental debt was found to have no
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correlation to any of the other variables. The reader should note
that the data is inconclusive in proving or disproving the
hypothesis for debt. However, there does appear to be a trend
forming as the variable has switched effects since 2001.
Due to its inability to present significance in the bi-variate
tests, there was no regression run on the model. Therefore, the
study was left with determining how to address the hypothesis. It
concluded that the hypothesis was disproved based on a lack of
relationship rather than an opposite relationship. This failed
hypothesis does little to help explain the causal relationship in
GDP. The only aid that the hypothesis provides is in showing that
the relationship is not based on governmental spending. The third
variable, however, displayed results that aided the study's
explanation of the causal relationship.
Hypothesis 3: Long-Term Unemployment Rate
In the bi-variate tests, the third hypothesis on
unemployment rate returned a positive correlation with corruption
each year. As Table 1 illustrates, the correlation's significance was
to the .01 level. Just as with GDP, unemployment showed a strong
correlation with GDP and Fertility. These three variables appeared
to make up the bulk of the causal relationship at hand.
The variable was then run in a regression model across the
five-year span. The regression model returned a causal
relationship as well. Table 3 indicates the level of the findings.
The reader will notice a high R2 value as well as strong
significance for the F value of the model. This causal relationship
gave the research insight into the potential reason for this
relationship. If the nature was due to job increases (based upon the
more open economic system allowed by a lack of potential
bureaucratic holds placed on the economy by political corruption)
then this would create more jobs, thus causing a decrease in the
number of unemployed people and an increase in the GDP of the
country due to increased production. The study has found that
both are present within the literature. Increases in job-creation
have; been occurring across the European Union, especially in
beginning years of the millennium (Economist 200,53). Across
the EMU, created jobs have lowered most countries unemployment
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rates by nearly two points (Economist 2000). Whether this trend
can be attributed to a fight against COlTuption, or corruption's role
in job-creation, is still hypothetical. Lastly, it should be noted that
this data shows a proof of the hypothesis proposed for
unemployment. As the study continues, we approach the fOUlih
variable- education.
Hypothesis 4: Education Level
Education level, as shown by Table I, showed no
significance to corruption over any year in the bi-variate analysis.
The levels are high enough though that we can draw conclusions.
Our hypothesis was that education would be positively correlated
to the corruption variable. In the first two years this was shown.
However, in the last three years there has been a shift to support
the counter-claim. Ifwe follow the logic of the causal relationship
that has been presented then we must conclude that job availability
pulled workers as well as students into the workforce and out of
the educational system. If this were true there would have to be a
correlation between education and unemployment. However, no
relationship exists. How then can we detcrmine the nature ofthis
relationship? It may be that the information is not within our data
to produce an answer or even a hypothetical answer to the question.
We should remind ourselves that thcre is no significance to this
r61ationship. It may be caused by chance. Further analysis of the
final two variables could aid this procedure. If not, the study may
be left with an unanswerable question. To further examine these
variables, the study now turns to fertility, a variable already known
to havc relationships with both GDP and Unemployment.
Hypothesis 5: Fertility Rate
The variable fertility rate was by far the strangest result of
this data analysis. When the bi-variate analysis was conducted,
fertility not only registered significance each year, it also rivaled
GDP and Unemployment as the top variable. As Table I illustrates,
fertility is strongly correlated to corruption, but it is also, as stated
above, correlated with GDP and Unemployment. When a year-by-
year regression was run on the variable it displayed significance in
every year. The model values displayed an R' value that was high
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as well as a strong F statistic and significance. Kaufmann et al.
already discovered this relationship between GDP and fertility
(Kaufmann et al. 1999); however, the finding of unemployment
rate was undocumented in the past.
The question that remained was how job availability related
to fertility. The original hypothesis was that corruption index
levels would correlate positively with fertility, based on the
replacement section. This was proven true. This research cannot
provide an explanation for this occurrence related to the job
creation explanation. The easiest assumption would be that these
are two separate causal relationships, maybe interconnected due to
the correlations between the three dependent variables, but fertility
could not playa role in job creation. Though this hypothesis
cannot be verified, it would explain all tlu"ee causal relationships if
shown to be true. Further research within job creation and feltility
possibilities is needed before this relationship can be adequately
understood.
Hypothesis 6: Infant Mortality Rate
This final variable was entered into the study as a
correlation variable for economic development as a whole. The bi-
variate tests concluded that infant mortality rate was not correlated
to corruption, or any other variable in the study. However, a small
significance and correlation is present. For the purposes of our
hypothesis we shall examine them. As Table 1 shows, the
correlations are all negative. This finding agrees with our
hypothesis. This means that as the corruption index increases,
infant mortality rate decreases. The question is whether or not
there is a causal relationship-the answer to this question is no.
Corruption levels decreasing cannot affect how many children will
die before the age of I without an intermediary variable. As we
thought, this finding does little to aid our claim regarding job
creation. However, it was a worthwhile variable given its place
within the scope of economic development.
Conclusions
To conclude, the study found that all of its new hypotheses
were correct except for the hypothesis concerning education. The
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data results wcrc confusing at first duc to education's usually high
role in detennining the advancemcnt of a state's economy. While
thc hypotheses proposcd for this study did not adcquately addrcss
this shift, ttlrthcr rcscarch could prescnt a possihle explanation.
Furthcr conclusions were that gross domestic product as
well as unemployment rate served as the two arcas of greatest
causation because of their closc relation to job creation. The other
two causal measures foclIsed on areas of economic development
that may not be as directly affccted by corruption.
As for the corollary measures, fcrtility was found to be
significant and thc infant mortality rate was not. However, both
followcd thcir hypotheses, and this data allowed thc study to
determine that infant mortality rate docs not represent an effective
mcasure for economic developmcnt as it pertains to corruption.
Furthcr rescarch could be conductcd in the arca of gendcr-specific
job creation as it is affectcd by corruption. In addition, as this
study was unable to incorporate data pertaining to either Malta or
Cyprus, further research could be done upon those countries.
Finally, the appearance of the shift in education poses questions
that this research was not able to answer. Further research
regarding the shift in education participation would be an
interesting annex to thc performed research.
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Res Publica
Variable (N)
Corruption vs. GOP
2004 (23)
2003 (23)
2002 (23)
2001 (23)
2000 (23)
Corruption vs. Debt
2004 (23)
2003 (23)
2002 (23)
2001 (23)
2000 (23)
Table I
Pearson's Cor. Cneff:
.731 **
.783**
.773**
.791 **
.753**
-.041
-.001
-.026
.003
.014
27
Pearson's Significance
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.847
.995
.908
.987
.949
Corruption vs. Unemployment
2004 (23)
2003 (23)
2002 (23)
2001 (23)
2000 (23)
Corruption vs. Education
2004 (23)
2003 (23)
2002 (23)
2001 (23)
2000 (23)
Corruption vs. Fertility
2004 (23)
2003 (23)
2002 (23)
2001 (23)
2000(23)
~.727**
~.726**
-.747**
-.790**
M.840**
-.188
-.261
-.175
.156
.145
.754**
.781 **
.720**
.746**
.691 **
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
.379
.219
.426
.478
.509
.000
.000
.000
.000
.000
Corruption vs. Infant Mortality Rate
2004 (23) -.122
2003 (23) -.221
2002 (23) -.216
2001 (23) -.289
2000 (23) -.280
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.0 I level (2-tailed)
.561
.300
.323
.182
.196
28
Regression
GOP
Table 2
Res Publica
'04 '03
Adjusted R2 .535 Adjusted R2 .595
F Stat. 26.439 F Stat. 34.832
F Stat. Sig. .000 F Stat. Sig. .000
Unstnrd Beta 14.820 Unstnrd Beta 15.242
Stnrd Beta .731 Stnrd Beta .783
t 5.142 t 5.902
Stat. Sig. .000 Stat. Sig. .000
'02 '01
Adjusted R2 .579 Adjusted R' .608
F Stat. 31.236 F Stat 35.100
F Stat. Sig. .000 F Stat Sig. .000
Unstnrd Beta 15.312 Unstnrd Beta 16.364
Stnrd Beta .773 Stnrd Beta .791
t 5.589 t 5.925
Stat. Sig. .000 Stat. Sig. .000
'00
Adjusted R2 .546
F Stat. 27.438
F Stat. Sig. .000
Unstnrd Beta 15.352
Stnre! Beta .753
t 5.238
Stat. Sig. .000
.507
24.65
.000
-.978
-.727
-4.968
.000
.691
50.249
.000
-1.104
-.840
-7.089
.000
.537
26.555
.000
-1.122
-.747
-5.153
.000
Res Publica
Regression
Unemployment
'04
Adjusted R1
F Stat.
F Stat. Sig.
Unstnrd Beta
Stnrd Bcta
t
Stat. Sig.
'02
Adjusted R1
F Stat.
F Stat. Sig.
Unstnrd Beta
Stnrd Beta
t
Stat. Sig.
'00
Adjusted R1
F Stat.
F Stat. Sig.
Unstnrd Bcta
Stnrd Bcta
t
Stat. Sig.
Table 3
'03
Adjusted R2
F Stat.
F Stat. Sig.
Unstnrd Bcta
Stnrd Beta
t
Stat. Sig.
'01
Adjusted R2
F Stat.
F Stat. Sig.
Unstnrd Bcta
Stnrd Bcta
t
Stat. Sig.
.505
24.457
.000
-1.0 13
-.726
-4.945
.000
.606
34.811
.000
-1.216
-7.90
-5.900
.000
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30 Res Publica
Table 4
Reg'ression
Fertility
'04 '03
Adjusted R2 .549 Adjusted R2 .593
F Stat. 30.261 F Stat. 34.473
F Stat. Sig. .000 F Stat. Sig. .000
Unstnrd Beta .093 Unstnrd Beta .095
Stnrd Beta .754 Stnrd Beta .781
t 5.501 t 5.871
Stat. Sig. .000 Stat. Sig. .000
'02 '01
Adjusted R2 .495 Adjusted R2 .535
F Stat. 22.591 F Stat. 26.334
F Stat. Sig. .000 F Stat. Sig. .000
Unstnrd Beta .086 Unstnrd Beta .091
Stnrd Beta .720 Stnrd Beta .746
t 4.753 t 5.12
Stat. Sig. .000 Stat. Sig. .000
'00
Adjusted R2 .453
F Stat. 13.192
F Stat. Sig. .000
Unstnrd Beta .077
Stnrd Beta .691
t 4.381
Stat. Sig. .000
